Analysis of institutional impact on economic growth in Ecuador: A focus on democracy and total debt
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.71068/hctteg52Keywords:
democracy, total debt, economic growth, GDPAbstract
This article addressed the interrelationship between institutionalism, the financial situation and economic growth in Ecuador, with the aim of offering an analysis that would contribute to the formulation of policies for the country's sustainable development. It began with a theoretical review supported by authors such as Douglas North, and Acemoglu and Robinson, who highlighted the essential role of institutions in economic progress. The research focused on three main variables: the Democracy Index, as an indicator of institutional quality; Total Debt, as a reflection of financial health; and GDP Growth, as a measure of economic development. These variables were key to understanding the factors that promoted or constrained the country's growth. Specific objectives were formulated to analyse each of these dimensions. First, the effect of institutionality was assessed through the Democracy Index, identifying areas for improvement. Then, the incidence of Total Debt on growth was studied, considering its impact in the short and long term. Finally, the study sought not only to understand these dynamics, but also to generate policy recommendations. Through a comprehensive approach, the study sought to provide useful findings that would contribute to the design of strategies aimed at promoting more sustainable and equitable economic development in the Ecuadorian context.
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